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INTRODUCTION

The quest for limited liability in business enterprises and
transactions has been a driving force in the development of
business organization law for centuries.
The historical
development of corporations and limited partnerships evidences
this primary goal. The recent development of the modern forms of
limited liability partnerships and limited liability companies proves
that this quest continues unabated. In addition, parties to
significant business transfer transactions have long sought by
construct and contract to apportion and limit their respective legal
responsibilities and liabilities.
Counterbalancing this inexorable trend toward limited liability
has been the penchant of common law jurisprudence to define its
limits. Common law theories of piercing the corporate veil and
successor liability, among others, have been developed and
expanded by the courts as equitable restraints on the strength of
business limited liability protections, making these protections
more akin to presumptions than unassailable principles.
1
If, as the famous aphorism goes, “hard cases make bad law,”
2
then hard business cases provide a recipe for Hungarian goulash.
So it is with the entrée recently served up by the Minnesota courts
in a series of substantive trial court determinations and three
reported appellate decisions, culminating in the Minnesota
3
Supreme Court’s recent en banc report of Johns v. Harborage I, Ltd..
Here’s how the recipe goes. Start with one business enterprise,
Gators Bar and Grill (“Gators”) located in the Mall of America
shopping center. Chop that business into three legally distinct
parts, all with intertwined relationships: a limited partnership that
leases the business premises, holds the liquor license, and owns the
operation’s physical assets; a second limited partnership that
provides management services to the business; and a corporation
that supplies employees to the business.
Add one sexual
harassment victim with a valid but unsatisfied judgment against the
corporate piece of the business. Separately arrange a transfer of
1. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
2. “An eclectic and uncoordinated mixture of something.” ENCARTA WORLD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY [N. AM. ED.] at http://encarta.msn.com/dictionary_
1861614774/goulash.html? (last visited July 20, 2004).
3. 664 N.W.2d 291 (Minn. 2003) (Gilbert, J., dissenting) [hereinafter Johns
III].

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss2/3

2

Matheson: The Limits of Business Limited Liability: Entity Veil Piercing an
MATHESON (CB & CKI)-REFORMATTED

2004]

LIMITS OF BUSINESS LIMITED LIABILITY

11/14/2004 5:28:26 PM

413

the assets of the first limited partnership, not found to be liable on
the harassment verdict, to a distinct, unrelated corporation, from
which satisfaction of the harassment judgment ultimately is sought.
Cover with a combination of both federal and state common and
statutory law. Combine all ingredients together and sprinkle
liberally with equitable considerations. The result is, as with many
other culinary creations, at least interesting. Whether or not one
finds it appealing or appetizing is, as in all matters of this kind,
dependant on one’s personal (legal) tastes.
This article seeks to make sense of the recipe and the ultimate
4
concoction that is Johns v. Harborage I, Ltd. (collectively “Johns”).
The legal substance of the case involves the use by business parties
of devices to limit their liabilities.
Part II describes the
development of limited liability entities (“LLEs”), and the use of
limited liability transactions, such as those employed by the
defendants in Johns, as well as exceptions to the applicable
5
presumptions of limited liability. Part III parses the facts and
6
history of the multiple Johns decisions. Part IV explains and
explores the rulings in Johns in light of the legal and equitable
principles surrounding the evolution of business limited liability
7
and its exceptions.
II. LIMITED LIABILITY ENTITIES AND TRANSACTIONS AND THEIR
LIMITS
Businesses and their owners regularly seek to limit the scope of
their liabilities. After all, the less liabilities a business has to pay or
assume, the greater the potential for profit for the owners in the
operation of the business. There are two distinct ways in which
these business liabilities may be limited. First, entrepreneurs may
take advantage of various state laws to create some form of limited
liability entity under which the business will operate. These
entities, such as traditional corporations and the newer limited
liability companies, have a legal existence separate from the owner
of the business and presumptively shield the owner from personal
obligation for the business debts. In the business context, this
might be referred to as “entity-based limited liability.”

4.
5.
6.
7.

Id.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
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Second, when two businesses engage in a transaction, such as a
purchase and sale of business assets, they may seek contractually or
structurally to limit the obligations of the transferee business for
the obligations of the transferor. This method of limiting
transactional liability attempts to have the price paid by the
transferee for the acquired assets reflect only the obligations
explicitly assumed.
In the business context, structuring
transactions so as to identify and minimize assumed and potential
liability can be referred to as “transaction-based limited liability.”
Both of these methods of business liability limitation were
employed in Johns and both were challenged by the plaintiff.
A. The Development and Limits of Limited Liability Entities
Much of the history of the development of business
organization law relates to attempts to create the perfect legal
vehicle for business purposes. Until the early to mid-1800s,
legislation in both England and the U.S. imposed strict limits on an
owner’s ability to incorporate and to receive the benefits of limited
8
liability. Incorporation typically required a special act of
9
Parliament or a state legislature.
State legislatures enacting
general corporation statutes usually imposed substantial limitations
on corporations, including minimum paid-in capital requirements,
10
limited permissible purposes, and limited duration.
As
corporations began to dominate the economic landscape, however,
legislatures removed nearly all of the original limitations on the
11
ability of corporations to organize and operate.
Following the Industrial Revolution, the development of
capital markets depended on limited liability protection. Capitalintensive businesses required substantial expenditures beyond the
means of the typical entrepreneur, necessitating the infusion of
12
Providing limited liability to those who
outside investment.
8. See Kenneth K. Luce, Trends in Modern Corporation Legislation, 50 MICH. L.
REV. 1291, 1293 (1952) (describing how "corporate charters were difficult and
expensive to obtain, the fruit of special privilege"); see also Morton J. Horwitz,
Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 208
(1986) ("It is not usually appreciated that truly limited shareholder liability was far
from the norm in America even as late as 1900.").
9. HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 24-25 (3d
ed. 1983).
10. See id. at 25-26.
11. See id. at 26-32.
12. See generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-
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contributed capital encouraged investment because people could
invest without risking their full personal net worth. Although
investors may be willing to risk their entire net worth in businesses
they operate themselves, they are not willing—absent limited
liability—to invest in businesses that they do not operate or closely
oversee. Limited liability enabled venture capitalists and casual
investors to invest in diverse enterprises without incurring the
13
excessive costs necessary to monitor each enterprise closely. More
broadly, this grant of limited liability to investors advanced national
economic policies by encouraging a broader base of participants in
14
business investment.
Corporate law, while securing this limited liability, provides
that corporate power must be exercised according to certain
mandatory rules that “govern defined issues in a manner that
15
cannot be varied by corporate actors.”
Most importantly, all
corporations presumptively must have a board of directors that acts
16
as the central governance group. Ownership is legally separate
from control. The owners/shareholders elect a board of directors
1937, 49-55 (1991) (describing post-industrial era shift toward limited liability for
shareholders calculated to facilitate infusion of capital into new businesses).
13. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 41-43 (1991) (reasoning that limited liability
encourages investor diversification and discourages close monitoring of each
individual investment).
14. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder
Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1879 (1991) (observing that limited
liability "creates incentives for excessive risk-taking by permitting corporations to
avoid the full costs of their activities"); David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort
Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1566 (1991) (describing "the
traditional corporate and economic justifications for limited liability" as "the need
to encourage investment in productive, albeit risky, activities").
15. Melvin Avon Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1461, 1461 (1989) (footnote omitted) (concerning “the legal rules that directly
concern the internal organization of the corporation and the conduct of
corporate actors”); see Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1553-54 n.16 (1989) (enumerating Delaware's mandatory
rules). But cf. Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for
Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1599, 1599-602, 1616 (1989)
(contesting Professor Gordon in part and arguing that although many
"mandatory" rules may be avoided, some may be desirable "when externalities are
present").
16. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001) (stating that a board of
directors is required unless otherwise provided in certificate of incorporation);
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (1999) (establishing that board of directors is
required unless all shareholders agree to nontraditional form of governance);
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.03 (1999) (stating number and election of directors
required).
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17

that makes business policy and manages the corporate enterprise,
resulting in a representative, as opposed to democratic, governance
structure. Beyond choosing the directors and acting on certain
extraordinary matters, corporate ownership and involvement in
18
business decisions and transactions is presumptively passive.
The development of the corporate entity was parallel to the
19
development of the limited partnership.
Situated as a hybrid
between the classic general partnership and the corporation, a
limited partnership has at least one general partner, who, like all
partners in a regular general partnership, must have unlimited
personal liability. The rest of the partners can be limited partners
who, like their corporate shareholder counterparts, do not have
personal liability for the debts of the enterprise.
In essence, the premise for allowing corporate limited liability
is continued in the limited partnership. Limited partners, like
shareholders in the corporation, have no management rights and
no personal liability. They trade their involvement in management
for the security of limited liability. General partners, on the other

17. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §
8.01(b) (1999) (establishing that business and affairs of corporations shall be
managed by or under direction of board of directors). Corporate law requires
shareholders to elect the board of directors through regularly scheduled annual
elections. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2001) ("[A]n annual meeting
of stockholders shall be held for the election of directors on a date and at a time
designated by or in the manner provided in the bylaws."); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §
7.01(a) (1999) ("A corporation shall hold a meeting of shareholders annually at a
time stated in or fixed in accordance with the bylaws."). To provide accountability,
perpetual directorships are often banned. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note
13, at 3 (noting that "states almost uniformly forbid perpetual directorships").
18. The main downside with the use of the corporate form has been its
unattractive tax treatment. A corporation is subject to double taxation: it is taxed
once as an entity, and its shareholders are taxed on distributions of dividends,
which are treated as ordinary income. See I.R.C. § 301-381 (2002) (imposing a
double tax on corporations).
19. Several of the entities involved in Johns were limited partnerships. Johns
III, 664 N.W.2d 291, 293 (Minn. 2003). New York ushered in the first limited
partnership statute in 1822 and soon other jurisdictions began adopting this
business form. Louisiana is the exception. See R. Kurt Wilke, Note, Limited
Partnership Control: A Reexamination of Creditor Reliance, 60 IND. L.J. 515, 516-18
(1985). In 1916, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act, which was subsequently enacted by nearly every state. Id.
In 1976, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved a Revised Uniform
Limited Partnership Act, which most jurisdictions adopted. Id. at 524-28, n.60. A
new revised Act has recently been promulgated and has been adopted by many
states, including Minnesota in 2004. 2004 Minn. Laws ch. 199 (codified as
amended at MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 323A.1-01- 323A.12-03 (West 2003)).
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hand, like directors and officers of a corporation, have
management authority but also some level of personal liability.
All in all, however, the standard limited partnership was only a
partial solution in the search for the perfect form of business
organization. While limited partners in limited partnerships could
enjoy the security of limited liability, a general partner still
remained subject to unlimited liability. In addition, the traditional
connection between management authority and personal liability
continued.
As the next and much more recent development of business
organization law, the limited liability company (“LLC”)
represented a significant step in the breakdown of the trade-off of
investor passivity for limited liability. Causing a minor business
20
revolution over the past several decades, the LLC was created out
21
of whole cloth.
The LLC represented a new hybrid to the
business entity montage. Unlike a limited partnership in which a
general partner has personal liability to third parties for the
recourse debts of the business, all owners of an LLC enjoy limited
22
liability—no owner bears personal responsibility for LLC debts.
In addition, most LLC codes derive from a partnership
organizational framework, with presumptive management by the
20. Some commentators early on questioned the LLC as a continuing form of
business entity. See, e.g., Karen C. Burke, The Uncertain Future of Limited Liability
Companies, 12 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 13, 16 (1995).
21. In 1977, Wyoming adopted the first modern LLC act in the United States.
See Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 158, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws 537
(codified as amended at WYO. STAT. ANN. 17-15-101 to -144 (2003)). The LLC
concept was introduced in Germany in 1892 by a law authorizing the formation of
the private limited company, the Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung ("GmbH,"
or LLC). See Kristin A. DeKuiper, The European Limited Liability Company - A
Comparison of the Czech, Slovak and German Examples with the New American Entity, 1
PARKER SCH. J. E. EUR. L. 291, 291 (1994). The limited partnership association,
adopted in Pennsylvania, Michigan, New Jersey, and Ohio in the 1870s, was
arguably the LLC's unsuccessful ancestor. See Wayne M. Gazur & Neil M. Goff,
Assessing the Limited Liability Company, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 387, 393-94 (1991)
(examining the implications and ramifications of the limited liability company).
In fact, the 1977 Wyoming statute utilized some language from the Ohio limited
partnership association statute. See id. at 395. Florida followed with LLC
legislation in 1982. Id. Presently, all states have some version of LLC legislation.
22. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-301 (2003) ("Except as
otherwise provided . . . no member shall be personally liable for the obligations of
the limited liability company . . . ."); N.J. STAT. ANN. 42:2B-23 (West Supp. 1996)
("Except as otherwise provided . . . the debts, obligations and liabilities of a limited
liability company, whether arising in contract, tort or otherwise, shall be solely the
debts, obligations and liabilities of the limited liability company . . . no member . .
. shall be obligated personally . . . .").
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23

owners/members. The common link in each of the LLC statutes
is either presumptive or optional management by the owners. The
concept of separating management authority from ownership is
gone. No longer is managerial passivity the price that must be paid
for limited liability.
Finally, the development of the “limited liability partnership”
or “registered limited liability partnership” (jointly “LLP”) as the
newest form of LLE highlights the breakdown of the final barriers
between passive investors and active managers. An LLP is first and
foremost a general partnership wherein the partners both own and
manage the business. Like the general partnership, there is no
separation between the partners’ roles as investors and as
managers. Almost as an aside, LLP statutes usually contain a oneparagraph provision restricting the limited liability of a LLP’s
24
owners if appropriate documentation is filed with the state.
In sum, today the traditional purposes for limited liability,
those of promoting passive investment and encouraging capital
development, have broadened. Legislatures’ purposes have
expanded from merely encouraging and protecting passive
investors to simply and actively promoting business. The limited
liability of corporate and limited partnerships promotes investment
and capital development, while new LLE forms, such as the limited
liability company and limited liability partnership, expect owner
involvement in running the business. This combination of active
management and presumptive limited liability that typifies the
modern closely held business organization is well represented by
the entities employed by the initial defendants in the Johns matter.
B. Traditional Piercing and Enterprise Entity Limits of Limited Liability
Despite the proliferation of limited liability business entity
forms, American law governing business limited liability has had a
23. See Gazur & Goff, supra note 21 (assessing the LLC form); Robert R.
Keatinge et al., The Limited Liability Company: A Study of the Emerging Entity, 47 BUS.
LAW. 375 (1992) (comparing LLCs to other business organization forms and
analyzing state LLC statutes).
24. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 323A.3-06(c), 323A.10-01 (2002). By combining
limited liability for general partners with the well-established partnership law
foundation, LLP legislation produced renewed interest in the partnership form.
The LLP is a solution for participants seeking a partnership structure with active
control but limited liability. Any thought of having to forego active involvement in
the business in order to obtain the protection of limited liability has been
eliminated.
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contentious history. In the 1800s, Thomas Cooper described
limited liability as a “mode of swindling, quite common and
honourable in these United States” and “a fraud on the honest and
25
confiding part of the public.” Yet, early in the twentieth century,
President Butler of Columbia University acclaimed business limited
liability as “the greatest single discovery of modern times” and that
“even steam and electricity are far less important than the limited
liability corporation, and they would be reduced to comparative
26
impotence without it.”
The decisions of the courts have reflected the ambivalence
that pervades the policy of allowing business LLEs. Use of the
corporate or other limited liability form for the operation of a
business presumptively shields the personal assets of the
27
owners/shareholders from the claims of the business’s creditors.
A court may be asked to ignore this liability shield when a voluntary
or involuntary creditor finds the corporation unable to pay its
debts. The creditor would then like the court to disregard or
“pierce” the statutory limited liability shield so that the debts of the
business might be satisfied out of the owners/shareholders’ assets,
personal or otherwise. Absent a judicial decision to “pierce the
veil” in this manner, the limited liability created by the applicable
corporate statute stays intact and the creditor must shoulder the
loss.
Therefore, the most typical way in which courts reflect the
policy ambivalence over limited liability is by “piercing the veil” of
the LLE to hold the owners of a business personally liable for the
business debts. This is the classic form of “piercing” and operates
28
vertically to hold the owner liable for the debts of the business.
25. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, at 50 (quoting THOMAS COOPER,
LECTURES ON THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 247, 250 (2d ed. 1830))
(footnote omitted).
26. STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 1.1, at 1-5 (2004)
(citation omitted).
27. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.22(b) (1999) ("Unless otherwise
provided in the articles of incorporation, a shareholder of a corporation is not
personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation . . . ."). See generally John
H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, A Call for a Unified Business Organization Law, 65
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 5-9 (1996).
28. To provide guidance on when the owner of a limited liability entity will
lose the benefit of limited liability, the place to start should be with the courts'
experiences over the years dealing with this issue in the corporate context. This is
not as helpful as one might think; the “tests” used by courts to determine whether
to pierce the limited liability veil are universally recognized as unhelpful. See, e.g.,
PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN
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An alternative form of LLE veil piercing is of a horizontal
nature, typically involving brother/sister or sibling corporations.
As will be explored in more detail later, this is the nature of the
piercing analysis employed by the courts in Johns. Sometimes a
single business enterprise is set up using separate and multiple
limited liability entities, operating on the same level and having the
same owners and/or managers. The claim of horizontal piercing
asks the court to ignore the separate legal existences of the sibling
corporations and pierce their veil so that the assets of all related
entities are available to satisfy creditor claims. The theory is that
the separate entities are simply parts of one unified business
enterprise and that the legal analysis should reflect that operational
reality.

THE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 8 (1983) (suggesting that court
decisions are "irreconcilable and not entirely comprehensible"); ROBERT CHARLES
CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 72 (1986) ("[T]he courts usually forgo any sustained
attempt at a remedial theory or even a coherent exposition of the basis of liability,
although descriptive summaries are occasionally attempted."); EASTERBROOK &
FISCHEL, supra note 13, at 54-55 ("[T]ests used by courts--whether a corporation
has a 'separate mind of its own,' whether it is a 'mere instrumentality,' and so forth-are singularly unhelpful."). The courts employ at least three conclusory "tests":
(1) the "agency" test under which the plaintiffs must establish that the
parent exercised a significant degree of control over the subsidiary's
decisionmaking;
(2) the "alter ego" test which is founded in equity and permits the court
to pierce the corporate veil when the court must prevent fraud, illegality
or injustice, or when recognition of the corporate entity would defeat
public policy or shield someone from liability from a crime;
(3) the "instrumentality" test under which the plaintiff must establish that
the parent exercises extensive control over the acts of the subsidiary
giving rise to the claim of wrongdoing; and
(4) the "integrated enterprise" test under which the court considers (a)
interrelation of operations, (b) centralized control of labor relations, (c)
common management, and (d) common ownership or financial control.
Richard v. Bell Atl. Corp., 946 F. Supp. 54, 61 (D.D.C. 1996) (citations omitted).
Application of these tests often consists largely of lists that the courts recite with
little analysis or justification. Some courts list as many as nineteen factors. See, e.g.,
Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc., 352 S.E.2d 93, 98-99 (W. Va. 1986) (listing 19 factors). A
sample list from one court recites "insufficient capitalization for purposes of
corporate undertaking, failure to observe corporate formalities, nonpayment of
dividends, insolvency of debtor corporation at time of transaction in question,
siphoning of funds by dominant shareholder, nonfunctioning of other officers
and directors, absence of corporate records, and existence of corporation as
merely a façade for individual dealings." Minnesota Power v. Armco, Inc., 937 F.2d
1363, 1367 (8th Cir. 1991). According to that court, an unspecified number of
these factors, combined with an element of "injustice or fundamental unfairness,"
would justify disregarding the corporation and holding the owners liable. Id.
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The classic cases of this nature involve the taxicab industry.
30
In Walkovszky v. Carlton, for example, a businessman, Carlton,
owned a taxicab business that he set up by creating ten separate
corporations, each of which owned two cabs and had one driver.
As simplified, the structure of this business is set out in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Entities Comprising Taxicab Business

CARLTON

Seon Cab Corp.

Cab Company 2

Cab Company 3

The plaintiff, Walkovszky, was severely injured when struck by
a taxicab owned by Seon Cab Corp. (“Seon”), but Seon’s assets
were insufficient to satisfy the judgment. At that point plaintiff had
two ways to argue for piercing the corporate veil: traditional vertical
piercing to hold Carlton personally liable as Seon’s owner, or
horizontal piercing between the separate cab companies so as to
aggregate their assets and increase the pool of assets available for
satisfaction of the judgment.
As to the traditional vertical piercing claim against Carlton
individually, the court in Walkovszky concluded that the complaint
was deficient because it was “barren of any ‘sufficiently
particular(ized) statements’ . . . that the defendant Carlton and his
associates are actually doing business in their individual capacities,
shuttling their personal funds in and out of the corporations
‘without regard to formality and to suit their immediate
31
convenience.’” However, the court concluded that the plaintiff
might succeed on a horizontal piercing claim. Walkovszky alleged
that “[a]lthough seemingly independent of one another, these
corporations are alleged to be ‘operated . . . as a single entity, unit
and enterprise’ with regard to financing, supplies, repairs,

29. See, e.g., Mangan v. Terminal Transp. Sys., 284 N.Y.S. 183 (N.Y, Sup. Ct.
1935), aff’d, 286 N.Y.S. 666 (N.Y. App. Div. 1936) (involving a parent corporation
that owned four taxicab entities and one entity that hired drivers). Other
industries are also represented. See, e.g., My Bread Baking Co. v. Cumberland
Farms, Inc., 233 N.E.2d 748 (Mass. 1968).
30. 223 N.E.2d 6 (N.Y. 1966).
31. Id. at 420 (internal citations omitted).
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employees and garaging, and all are named as defendant.” Thus,
the separate existence of the ten business entities operating as
individual taxicab companies under common ownership might be
“pierced” and their assets aggregated into one judicially reformed
legal entity for purposes of liability. As the Court analyzed the
situation it clearly distinguished vertical from horizontal piercing:
In the case before us, the plaintiff has explicitly alleged
that none of the corporations “had a separate existence of
their own” and, as indicated above, all are named as
defendants. However, it is one thing to assert that a
corporation is a fragment of a larger corporate combine
which actually conducts the business. It is quite another
to claim that the corporation is a “dummy” for its
individual stockholders who are in reality carrying on the
business in their personal capacities for purely personal
rather than corporate ends. Either circumstance would
justify treating the corporation as an agent and piercing
the corporate veil to reach the principal but a different
result would follow in each case. In the first, only a larger
corporate entity would be held financially responsible while,
in the other, the stockholder would be personally liable.
Either the stockholder is conducting the business in his
individual capacity or he is not. If he is, he will be liable; if
he is not, then, it does not matter—insofar as his personal
liability is concerned—that the enterprise is actually being
33
carried on by a larger “enterprise entity.”
This theory of horizontal piercing is sometimes referred to as
the “enterprise entity” or “enterprise liability” theory of judicial veil
piercing and entity reformation. The label comes from a famous
article by Adolph Berle, where he posits that:
[a]nother illustration of judicial erection of a new entity
occurs in situations where the corporate personality (as
embodied in its charter, books and so forth) does not
correspond to the actual enterprise, but merely to a
fragment of it. The result is to construct a new aggregate
of assets and liabilities. The decisions disregard the paper
corporate personalities and base the results on the assets
34
of the enterprise.

32. Id. at 416.
33. Id. at 418-19 (citations omitted).
34. Adolph Berle, Jr., The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 343, 348
(1947).
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C. Transactional Limitation of Liability: Asset Transfers
The concept of transactionally limiting business liability is
initially very straightforward. Indeed, it is a concept that we all use
and rely upon on a daily basis. For example, if I own an
automobile and you want to buy it from me, all we have to do is
agree on price and any other relevant terms and then I will give you
the keys to the car and you will pay me for it. The result is a
transfer of assets for valid consideration.
Assume that in addition to having an automobile for sale, I
also have an outstanding balance on an unsecured loan from a
financial institution that I took out to finance the original purchase
of the car. If you buy my automobile from me, are you responsible
for the loan as well? Of course not—unless you agree to be.
A similar analysis applies to transfers of assets between
businesses. If one business owns real property or personal
property, or has intangible property rights, such as intellectual
property, franchise, or contract rights, those assets are
presumptively transferable to another business entity without the
transferee incurring any obligations not voluntarily assumed as part
of the transaction. The analysis becomes slightly more complicated
when, instead of a discrete asset being transferred between
businesses, one business basically wants to acquire the total
operations of another company. This is what businesspersons and
lawyers refer to as the stuff of “mergers and acquisitions,” or M&A,
for short.
As a starting point, there are various ways in which one
business can acquire another. One common method is for the
business to be acquired, often referred to as the “target,” to merge
into the acquiring business (or a subsidiary). A merger occurs
when two or more business entities combine to produce a single
35
entity (the “surviving” entity) pursuant to a merger plan. If one
business decides to acquire another company through direct
absorption, a “two-party” merger takes place. The acquiring entity
35. Mergers can be direct or indirect, depending upon the presence of a
subsidiary. When a corporation is merged directly into the acquiring corporation,
only the acquiring corporation survives the merger. With "triangular" mergers, a
corporation merges with a newly formed subsidiary of the acquiring corporation
and the surviving corporation becomes a subsidiary of the acquiring corporation.
A transaction constitutes a "merger" regardless of whether the corporation
surviving the merger is a previously existing operating corporation or is a new
corporation formed solely for the purpose of surviving the merger.
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(A) gives the existing owners of the target company (T) cash, stock
or other property in order to purchase the target business. The
transaction looks like Figure 2.
Figure 2: Merger of Two Business Entities

T

A

T = TARGET ENTITY
A = ACQUIRING ENTITY
= DIRECTION OF ASSETS AND
LIABILITIES POST MERGER

S
(T+A)
S = SURVIVING ENTITY RESULTING
FROM T AND A MERGER

When a merger becomes effective, a number of significant
changes occur simultaneously. Primarily, only the surviving entity
continues in existence, eliminating the separate existence of the
constituent organizations. The two businesses literally and legally
become one. As a result, the surviving entity has all of the
privileges, powers, property, rights, and other interests of each of
36
the constituent entities.
More significantly for the current
discussion, the surviving entity becomes liable for all liabilities and
obligations of all constituent organizations, and claims or
proceedings against a constituent company may be pursued against
37
the surviving entity.
Therefore, quite literally, the assets and
liabilities of the constituent organizations become merged into and
the responsibility of the surviving entity. To continue with our
36. With respect to mergers of Minnesota corporations, see, for example,
Minnesota Statutes section 302A.641, subdivisions 2(a) and 2(c) (2002).
37. As to Minnesota corporations, see, for example Minnesota Statutes
section 302A.641, subdivision 2(e) (2002).
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automobile and loan sales transaction analogy posited earlier, in a
merger, the surviving entity gets both the car and the loan.
Given that a merger necessarily results in acquisition of all of
the liabilities as well as the assets of the target entity, businesses
seeking to make acquisitions sometimes seek an alternative
transactional structure that allows selectivity with respect to the
liabilities assumed. This alternative structure is the asset transfer.
In an asset transfer, the two constituent organizations exchange
operational assets for cash or other consideration, but do not
merge and do not become a single entity. Each business starts as a
separate entity and each business survives as a distinct entity with its
own separate existence after the asset transfer. An asset transfer
between two businesses looks like Figure 3.
Figure 3: Asset Transfer Between Business Entities

T

A

= DIRECTION OF ASSETS (NOT
LIABILITIES) POST TRANSFER
= DIRECTION OF
CONSIDERATION FOR ASSET
ACQUISITION
T = TRANSFEROR ENTITY
A = ACQUIRING ENTITY

Legally, the distinction between a merger and an asset transfer
is monumental. With the former, the acquiring entity has no
choice in selecting among the target’s assets and liabilities. The
acquirer succeeds to the amalgam of the two original entities. With
the latter, however, the acquiring entity can selectively choose
which assets and which, if any, liabilities it wants to acquire. Quite
literally, the acquiring entity can take the car without acquiring any
obligation for the loan. Moreover, even if liabilities will be assumed
as part of an asset transfer transaction, the specific obligations
assumed can be separately identified and priced. That is, the
consideration paid for the acquired assets (and possibly liabilities)
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will reflect the basket of items acquired. Therefore, at least from
the liability minimization perspective, an asset acquisition is a much
more favorable transactional acquisition structure than a merger.
D. Successor Liability as a Basis for Expanding Transactional Liability
The basic legal rule of liability in an asset transfer is that a
purchaser or other transferee of business assets from another
business entity is not responsible for the debts and obligations of
the transferring entity. For example, the Minnesota Business
Corporation Act (“MBCA”) expressly provides that a transferee of
substantially all of the assets of a Minnesota corporation is liable for
the debts, obligations, and liabilities of the transferor only to the
extent contractually assumed by the transferee or otherwise
38
provided in the MBCA or by other Minnesota Statutes.
This legislative directive has generally been followed by
Minnesota courts. For example, in product liability cases decided
since section 302A.661, subdivision 4, was enacted, courts have
found no successor liability in part because of the Minnesota
legislation and in part because prior Minnesota case law also
39
limited such liability. In Niccum v. Hydra Tool Corp., the court, in
38. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.661, subd. 4 (West 2003 & Supp. 2004).
39. 438 N.W.2d 96, 99 (Minn. 1989). One of the exceptions to successor
liability noted by the Niccum court is the doctrine of de facto merger. Id. at 98.
Minnesota jurisprudence on de facto merger is still developing. According to the
Minnesota Federal District Court, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has applied a
multi-factor analysis to determine whether a de facto merger occurred:
(1) Whether there is a continuation of the enterprise of the seller
corporation, so that there is a continuity of management, personnel,
physical location, assets and general business operation.
(2) Whether there is a continuity of shareholders which results from the
purchasing corporation paying for the acquiring asset with shares of its
own stock, this stock ultimately coming to be held by the shareholders of
the corporation so that they become a constituent part of the purchasing
corporation.
(3) Whether the seller corporation ceases its ordinary business
operations, liquidates and dissolves as soon as legally and practically
possible.
(4) Whether the purchasing corporation assumed the obligation of the
seller ordinarily necessary for the continuation of normal business
operations of the seller corporation.
Gamradt v. Fed. Labs., Inc., No. 02CV816JMR/RLE, 2003 WL 22143729, at *3 (D.
Minn. Sept. 2, 2003) (citations omitted). The Federal District Court adopted the
Minnesota Court of Appeals’ analysis of de facto merger and predicted that the
Minnesota Supreme Court, given the opportunity, would adopt it as well. Id. at *4;
see Fine v. Schwinn Cycling Fitness, Inc., No. C3-00-1079, 2000 Minn. App. LEXIS
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affirming summary judgment in favor of a transferee corporation,
noted that section 302A.661, subdivision 4, indicates the Minnesota
legislature’s intent to limit any extension of successor liability. In
40
Everest v. American Transportation Corp., an Arkansas corporation
purchased assets from another Arkansas corporation and
continued to manufacture the same products as the transferor at
the same plant with many of the same employees that the
transferor had used. In a suit relating to a death allegedly resulting
from the negligent design and manufacture of the product by the
corporation’s transferor, the U.S. District Court for Minnesota
granted summary judgment to the transferee on grounds that
Minnesota does not impose liability on a transferee even if it
engages in essentially the same manufacturing operations as the
41
transferor.
Despite this general rule, state courts have traditionally applied
four exceptions to the presumption of non-liability of transferees.
These exceptions are:
Generally where one corporation sells or otherwise
transfers all of its assets to another corporation, the latter
is not liable for debts and liabilities of the transferor,
except: (1) where the purchaser expressly or impliedly
agrees to assume such debts; (2) where the transaction
amounts to a consolidation or merger of the corporation;
(3) where the purchasing corporation is merely a
continuation of the selling corporation; and (4) where the
transaction is entered into fraudulently in order to escape
42
liability for such debts.
In addition, both the statute itself and the Reporter’s Notes
establish that the statute does not override transferee liability under
43
federal and state statutes. As discussed in detail below, it is the
1292, at *6-7 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2000) (unpublished) (explaining
multifactor merger test).
40. 685 F. Supp. 203 (D. Minn. 1988).
41. Id. at 207-08.
42. J.F. Anderson Lumber Co. v. Myers, 296 Minn. 33, 37-38, 206 N.W.2d 365,
368-69 (1973) (citing with approval 15 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7122 (perm. ed., rev. vol.
2004)); see Costello v. Unipress Corp., No. C6-95-2341, 1996 WL 106215, at *1
(Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 1996). Language in those cases suggests that section
302A.661, subdivision 4, would not protect a transferee from liability for transfers
effected fraudulently to escape liability for the transferor’s obligations.
43. Minnesota Statutes section 302A.661, subdivision 4, states that the
transferee is liable for the transferor’s obligations to the extent provided in other
Minnesota statutes. The Reporter’s Notes to § 302A.661, subd. 4, recite that
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interplay of this federal and state liability in the asset transfer
context that is an important aspect of the Johns decisions in the
Minnesota appellate courts.
III. JOHNS V. HARBORAGE I, LTD.
A. The Facts and Preliminary Decisions
In 1993, Lori Johns worked as a server at Gators Bar and
44
Ms. Johns was sexually
Restaurant at the Mall of America.
45
harassed by a coworker while working there in February of 1993.
46
One month later, Ms. Johns resigned from her position at Gators,
and on January 14, 1994, she filed unlawful discrimination charges
47
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).
48
In June 1995, the EEOC issued Ms. Johns a right-to-sue notice.
On September 15, 1995, she filed a sexual harassment suit against
Gators in Minnesota District Court under both Title VII of the
49
Federal Civil Rights Act and section 363.01 of the Minnesota
50
Human Rights Act (“MHRA”).
At the time of the sexual harassment in 1993, Gators was
operated by three legal entities. FPM, Ltd. (“FPM”) was a Texas
51
limited partnership formed in May 1992, that leased the Gators
premises from the Mall of America Company, held the liquor
52
license, and owned all the furniture, fixtures, equipment and
53
inventory. Harborage I, Ltd. (“Harborage I”) was a Texas limited

“federal statutes may preempt this statute in certain areas of liability.” REPORTER’S
NOTES—1981 TO SECTION 302A.661 OF THE MBCA, at 298, 2003-04 Special
Pamphlet, 298 (2003) reported in WEST’S MINNESOTA CORPORATION, LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANY, AND PARTNERSHIP LAWS (2004-05).
44. Johns III, 664 N.W.2d 291, 292 (Minn. 2003).
45. See Johns v. Harborage I, Ltd., 585 N.W.2d 853, 856 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998)
[hereinafter Johns I].
46. Id. at 857.
47. Id. Ms. Johns also filed charges with the Minnesota Human Rights
Department (MHRD), but for the purposes of this comment, the EEOC charges
are the only relevant charges. Johns III, 664 N.W.2d at 293.
48. See infra Part III-A.
49. 42 U.S.C. § § 2000e to 2000e-16c (2000).
50. Johns III, 664 N.W.2d at 293. See also MINN. STAT. § 363.01 (2002)
(currently codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.04 (West 2003)).
51. Charles W. Greener Aff. ¶ 6.
52. Johns III, 664 N.W.2d at 293.
53. Id. at 300.
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54

partnership formed in December 1991,
that provided
55
56
management services to Gators (and at least seven other bars) as
57
a general contractor. Harborage, Inc. was a Texas corporation
58
incorporated in 1986 that provided employees for Gators and
59
60
issued paychecks to Gators’ employees as a subcontractor. All
three businesses shared the same offices in Dallas, Texas and all
three shared ties to both Charles W. Greener and Joyce O.
61
McReynolds.
Ms. Johns originally brought her employment discrimination
62
suit against Harborage, Inc., the company that issued the checks
for her work. Harborage, Inc. initially admitted to being Johns’s
63
employer.
In July 1996, defense counsel requested that Johns
amend her complaint to list Harborage I as her employer. Johns
made this change. Then in October 1996, defense counsel advised
Johns that Harborage, Inc. was actually her employer at the time of
her harassment, so the parties stipulated to a change in the
complaint again. One month later, Harborage, Inc. filed for

54. Greener Aff. ¶ 4.
55. Johns III, 664 N.W.2d at 293.
56. Patrick B. Hennessy Aff. of May 14, 2001, Ex. 4 at 12 (Asset Purchase
Agreement Disclosure Schedule 3(g): Benefit Plans).
57. Greener Aff. ¶ 10.
58. Johns III, 664 N.W.2d at 293.
59. Id.
60. Greener Aff. ¶ 10.
61. Johns III, 664 N.W.2d at 293. The Charles W. Greener Trust was the sole
shareholder of Main Event, Inc. (“Main Event”) which in turn, held thirty-nine
percent of FPM and one hundred percent of Harborage, Inc., outright. William J.
Morris Aff. of 2/20/97, Ex. F at 11 (Intoxicating Liquor or Wine License
Application). Through Harborage, Inc., Main Event also held 99% of FPM. Johns
I, 585 N.W.2d at 860. McReynolds held the positions of President, Vice-President,
Secretary, Treasurer and sole Director in: (1) Harborage, Inc., (2) Harborage
Services, Inc. (the general partner in FPM), (3) FPM I, Inc. (the general partner in
FPM), and (4) Main Event, Inc. Johns I, 585 N.W.2d at 859. When FPM was
formed, Leon Carroll signed as President of both Harborage I and Harborage
Services, Inc. (“Harborage Services”). Id. However in 1995, when Harborage, Inc.
transferred its interest as a limited partner in FPM to AFSC Services I, Ltd.,
McReynolds signed as the President of Harborage, Inc. and Harborage Services.
Id. Greener states in his affidavit that he took over as President of Harborage, Inc.
in 1996. Greener Aff. ¶ 1. In the application for a liquor license that she
submitted to the City of Bloomington, Minnesota, McReynolds listed herself as
Main Event’s sole director, and the holder of “All Offices.” Morris Aff., Ex. F. at
11. Greener, on the other hand, stated that Main Event was a holding company
with no employees. Greener Aff. ¶ 3.
62. Johns I, 585 N.W.2d at 857.
63. Id.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004

19

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 3
MATHESON (CB & CKI)-REFORMATTED

430

11/14/2004 5:28:26 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:2

64

bankruptcy protection. Ms. Johns then filed a motion to amend
her complaint to name Harborage I and FPM as defendants, which
65
the district court granted.
On September 8, 1997, following a bench trial, the district
court concluded that Harborage, Inc. and Harborage I was a
66
simple integrated enterprise, each of which could be considered
Ms. Johns’s employer for purposes of her lawsuit, and that they had
submitted Ms. Johns to a hostile work environment based on her
67
sex.
The district court awarded damages, including punitive
68
damages and attorney fees, to Ms. Johns against Harborage I. The
district court however, dismissed all claims against FPM stating only
that: “Defendant FPM, Ltd., while sharing some common
ownership, was only the lessee and holder of the liquor license at
Gators, but not involved in management or labor relations to a
69
degree sufficient to be considered plaintiff’s employer.”
Before the district court judgments were entered, Jillian’s
entered into an asset purchase agreement (“APA”) with FPM, Ltd.
and other entities, to purchase the assets of Gators and two other
70
71
bars at the Mall of America. In May 1998 the APA closed. In the
APA, Jillian’s agreed to assume certain liabilities of the sellers, but
72
the lawsuit involving Ms. Johns was not one of those liabilities.
After all, this made sense since FPM had been dismissed by the
district court from lawsuit with Ms. Johns. It would have indeed
been odd if the parties had made specific reference to this matter.
At the same time, Jillian’s entered into a Transition Services

64. Id.
65. Id. This whole exchange between the parties seems strange and possibly
less than honest. But neither the court of appeals nor the supreme court
addresses this issue directly.
66. Id. at 858.
67. Id. at 857.
68. Id.
69. Johns v. Harborage I, Ltd., No. PI. 95-17129, at ¶ 53 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Sept.
8, 1997) (district court’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for
judgment).
70. Johns v. Harborage I, Ltd., 645 N.W.2d 761, 763 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002)
[hereinafter Johns II].
71. Id.
72. Id. The APA did not specifically mention the lawsuit with Johns.
Harborage I was not a party to the APA, but $3.7 million of the purchase price
went to pay management fees that would have been payable to Harborage I up
until shortly before the transaction. Johns v. Harborage, Inc., No. PI 95-17129 at 4
(Minn. Dist. Ct. Sept. 30, 2000) (district court memorandum). FPM I, Inc.
received $352,491 of those management fees. Hennessy Aff., Ex. 2 at 1.
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Agreement (“TSA”) with Harborage I so that Harborage I would
continue to provide administrative and labor services to Gators
73
until certain employees could be transferred to Jillian’s payroll.
Jillian’s commenced operating Gators without substantial change.
It retained the same name, location, supervisors, managers,
employees, uniforms, pay, benefit, décor, menu, furniture, and
74
equipment.
In February 1998, Harborage I appealed the district court
75
ruling.
In November 1998, the court of appeals affirmed the
district court ruling, except as to punitive damages, and later
76
awarded Ms. Johns appellate attorney fees. In March of 1999,
while attempting to collect on her judgment, Ms. Johns discovered
that Harborage I could not satisfy any of the judgment because its
77
assets had been liquidated. As a result, Ms. Johns moved to add
Jillian’s as a defendant to her complaint on the theory of successor
78
liability. On September 30, 2000, the district court granted Ms.
79
Johns’s motion to add Jillian’s as a defendant.
Ms. Johns then moved for summary judgment against Jillian’s
80
as a successor to the defendants already found liable in the action.
Jillian’s filed a cross motion for summary judgment, objecting to
81
the procedure by which it was made a party to the action and
82
denying succession of Harborage I. The district court granted Ms.
Johns’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that: (1)
73. Johns II, 645 N.W.2d at 763.
74. Johns III, 664 N.W.2d at 294.
75. Johns II, 645 N.W.2d at 763.
76. Id.
77. Johns III, 664 N.W.2d at 293. Ms. Johns attempted to enforce her
judgments against Harborage I, but discovered in March that Harborage I had
liquidated itself, retaining only de minimis assets located outside of Minnesota. Id.
According to one of Ms. Johns’s attorneys, Patrick B. Hennessy of Best and
Flanagan, Harborage I used the gross income it received through management
fees to pay its managers’ salaries. Telephone Interview with Patrick B. Hennessy,
Partner, Best and Flanagan (May 19, 2004). Harborage I’s only assets were
computers and desks which Harborage I liquidated by auction. Id. Ms. Johns was
unable to locate the proceeds from that auction. Id.
78. Johns II, 645 N.W.2d at 763. Harborage I did not oppose the motion to
amend the complaint to include Jillian’s as a defendant. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. While the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed this issue in its opinion,
this article assumes that the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled correctly when it
found permissible the procedure used in adding Jillian’s to the complaint in this
case.
82. Johns II, 645 N.W.2d at 764.
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“the effect, if not the intent,” of the APA was to block collection of
a valid judgment; (2) Jillian’s was aware of the “vital role”
Harborage I played in the operation of Gators; (3) the same
management personnel remained following Jillian’s purchase; and
83
(4) Jillian’s knew well its potential liability.
The district court
ordered the judgments amended to add Jillian’s as a judgment
84
debtor. The court of appeals reversed, finding that Jillian’s was
85
not a successor of Harborage I.
B. The Supreme Court Opinion
In an en banc decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed
the court of appeals rulings and held that the classification of
86
Jillian’s as Harborage I’s successor was correct. As stated by the
majority, the issue at the heart of the case was “whether Jillian’s can
be considered a successor employer for purposes of enforcing the
87
judgment obtained against Harborage I.”
Significantly, the court held that under Minnesota corporate
88
law, Jillian’s was not liable to Ms. Johns. When Ms. Johns sought
to enforce the judgment against Harborage I, she was unable to
collect because the employer’s assets had been liquidated, and Ms.
89
Johns then sought a judgment against Jillian’s.
The supreme
court held that purchasers of corporate assets are liable only to the
extent provided for by contract, and, therefore, Jillian’s did not
have successor corporation liability under Minnesota’s corporate
90
law. Because Jillian’s had only agreed to assume certain specified
liabilities (which did not include discrimination claims) under the
APA and TSA, the court ruled that, under Minnesota Statutes
section 302A.661, subdivision 4, Jillian’s was not liable for the
91
judgment as a successor to the former Gators entities.
The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled, however, that the
protection against transferee liability under Minnesota Statutes
section 302A.661, subdivision 4, does not apply to successor liability

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Johns III, 664 N.W.2d 291, 294 (Minn. 2003).
Johns II, 645 N.W.2d at 764.
Id. at 767.
Johns III, 664 N.W.2d at 299 (Gilbert, J., dissenting).
Id. at 296.
Id. at 297.
Id. at 293-94.
Id. at 297.
Id.
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92

applicable to Title VII claims.
The court rejected Jillian’s
argument that federal successor liability could not extend beyond
state successor liability, recognizing that federal successor liability is
93
federal common law, independent from state law.
Acknowledging, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court has not
ruled on the issue of whether successor liability applies to Title VII
cases, the court noted that the federal circuits uniformly apply
successor liability to Title VII cases and concluded that this
94
application is proper in light of the nature and goal of Title VII.
After justifying its application of federal successor liability to
the Johns case, the court analyzed the particular facts of Johns under
the two pronged inquiry it outlined: whether there existed
continuity of the business and whether Jillian’s as a successor had
95
The court
notice of the underlying claims by Ms. Johns.
concluded that the undisputed facts showed a substantial
96
continuity of business operations. In examining the continuity of
business operations, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered the
97
entire Gators restaurant as the business. The court argued that
even though the owners of Gators were free to “unbundle the
business into as many legal entities as they choose, the policies that
underlie Title VII cannot be avoided by attempting to confine the
‘employer’ function to a limited entity that has no purpose
98
Under the federal
independent of the business as a whole.”
doctrine, the court did not focus on the formalities of the APA or
TSA; rather it focused on the fact that the buyer basically
continued the business with no change in management, location,
or other attributes. Noting that the location and people remained
the same, the court ruled that, as a matter of law, the continuity of
99
the business had been established.
92. Id. at 299.
93. Id. at 298.
94. See id. The court cites other cases extending federal successor employer
liability to Title VII cases. See EEOC v. G-K-G, Inc., 39 F.3d 740, 747-48 (7th Cir.
1994); EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936, 945 (7th Cir. 1988); In re Nat’l Airlines,
Inc., 700 F.2d 695, 698 (11th Cir. 1983); Dominguez v. Hotel, Motel, Rest. & Misc.
Bartenders Union Local # 64, 674 F.2d 732, 733 (8th Cir. 1982); Trujillo v.
Longhorn Mfg. Co. Inc., 694 F.2d 221, 224-25 (10th Cir. 1982); Slack v. Havens,
522 F.2d 1091, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 1975).
95. See Johns III, 664 N.W.2d at 299-300.
96. Id. at 299.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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With regard to the notice requirement, the court noted that
Jillian’s did not contend that it lacked notice of the judgment
100
against Harborage I.
In fact, Jillian’s hired employees who were
involved in the litigation with Ms. Johns, including Harborage I’s
human resources director, who was an active member of the
101
litigation.
Based on this, the court ruled that Jillian’s was aware
of the judgment for Ms. Johns and had the opportunity to take that
102
The court
judgment into account when bargaining for Gators.
ruled that Jillian’s had the proper notice required for successor
103
liability to attach.
As a result, Johns III met both prongs of the
federal test the Minnesota Supreme Court outlined and the court
104
added Jillian’s to the judgment.
The dissent took issue with the majority’s successor liability
105
The dissent argued Jillian’s was not a successor to the
analysis.
106
defendant, Harborage I. While the dissent admitted that the U.S.
Supreme Court does not distinguish between mergers,
consolidations, and asset transfers in applying federal successor
liability, the dissent argued that all of the case law applying the
107
doctrine involves at least one of those three types of transfers.
The dissent asserted that since Harborage I and Jillian’s were not
involved in any of those types of transfers, they did not have a
108
predecessor to successor relationship.
The dissent further
argued that by naming Jillian’s a successor, the district court and
the Minnesota Supreme Court were essentially overturning the
previous district court ruling that held that FPM was not liable to

100. Id.
101. Id. at 299-300.
102. Id. at 300.
103. Id. Because a judgment had already been entered in the case, the
requirement for filing an EEOC claim was clearly met. Johns had to file the EEOC
claim before she could bring a suit against Harborage I. Id. at 295-96.
104. Id. at 300.
105. The dissent agreed with only three propositions the majority set forth.
First, Justice Gilbert agreed that Minnesota corporate law did not make Jillian’s
liable as a successor. Id. Second, he agreed that federal successor liability did not
distinguish between the types of asset transfers when examining successor liability.
Id. Third, he agreed that federal successor liability applied to labor law issues. Id.
at 300-03. The dissent took issue with the procedure used to join Jillian’s as a
defendant in the case. Id. at 303. This comment focuses solely on the federal
successor liability issue; hence, it will not discuss or address the dissent’s
arguments on the procedure used to join Jillian’s.
106. See id. at 301-02 (Gilbert, J., dissenting).
107. Id.
108. Id.
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109

Ms. Johns.
Finally, according to the dissent, the majority had
imposed a dramatic new risk on those who would acquire the assets
of an ongoing business that will result in an unwieldy increase in
buyers’ due diligence investigations attempting to protect against
110
that risk.
IV. UNDERSTANDING THE LIMITS OF LIMITED LIABILITY IN JOHNS
The rulings by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Johns III
implicate both entity-based limited liability and transaction-based
limited liability. Jillian’s could not be held liable to Ms. Johns
unless Jillian’s was found to have some connection with the entity
that was John’s employer at the time of the unlawful
discrimination, that is, Harborage, Inc.
This determination
requires an analysis of entity-based limited liability and its
enterprise entity exception. In addition, even if some relationship
existed between Jillian’s and Ms. Johns’s former employer, Jillian’s
must be found to be the employer’s successor. This second
determination requires an analysis of transaction-based limited
liability and its successorship limitations. Only by exploring these
two pieces separately can the conclusions in Johns III be understood
and considered for their ultimate merits.
Consider the quandary of the Minnesota courts as the Johns
case progressed. Remember that the Gators business originally was
separated into discrete pieces, as illustrated by Figure 4.

109. Id. at 301-02. The dissent argued that by finding successor liability, the
court was denying the separate legal existence of the various entities created to
operate Gators. Id. at 301. According to the dissent, the majority created a new
rule that as long as the owners of various entities benefited from a transaction,
those entities could be considered as one entity. Id.
110. Id. at 300. After arguing that the method of transfer did not support the
application of federal successor liability, the dissent further argued that the
remedy sought by Johns did not support the application of the doctrine either. Id.
at 302. The dissent made the point that the federal successor employer doctrine is
an equitable doctrine and cases where courts employed it involved at least some
equitable relief. Id. In the present case, the dissent argued that there were no
equitable principles involved because Johns only sought monetary damages. See id.
The dissent claimed that neither equitable nor legal principles supported a
finding of successor liability in Johns and as a result, the Court should not have
named Jillian’s as a successor liable to Johns. Id.
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Figure 4: Entities Comprising Gators Restaurant
McReynolds and Greener

Harborage, Inc.

Harborage I,
Ltd.

FPM, Ltd.

Initially, the district court was faced with a valid discrimination
lawsuit against one of those pieces, Harborage, Inc., which had
111
been identified as Ms. John’s employer.
On the eve of trial,
112
To deal with
Harborage, Inc. filed for bankruptcy protection.
this conundrum, the district court determined that Harborage, Inc.
and Harborage I, Ltd. were so interrelated in the labor relations
aspect of the Gators business that they could both be treated as Ms.
113
Johns’s “employer” for purposes of liability under Title VII.
At
the same time, the district court determined that FPM, Ltd. was not
sufficiently interrelated so as to be considered Ms. Johns’s
114
employer. These initial determinations by the district court were
115
based on Title VII federal law concepts of who is an “employer.”
Believing that it had supplied Ms. Johns with a viable remedy
through its use of the joint employer or integrated employer
doctrine under Title VII, the district court entered judgment for
Ms. Johns against both Harborage, Inc. and Harborage I, Ltd., but
116
not against FPM, Ltd.
But that was not the end of the saga.
When Ms. Johns attempted to collect on her judgment, she
discovered that Harborage I could not satisfy her judgment because

111. Johns I, 585 N.W.2d 853, 857 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
112. Id.
113. Johns III, 664 N.W.2d at 293.
114. Id.
115. Id. There is and was a substantial jurisprudence under Title VII allowing
more than one entity to be treated as the employer if there is a sharing of
employment related functions. See, e.g., Stephen F. Befort, Labor Law and the
Double-Breasted Employer: A Critique of the Single Employer and Alter Ego Doctrines and a
Proposed Reformulation, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 67 (1987); Mark Crandley, The Failure of
the Integrated Enterprise Test: Why Courts Need to Find New Answers to the MultipleEmployer Puzzle in Federal Discrimination Cases, 75 IND. L.J. 1041 (2000); Gina M.
Delahunt, Pointing Fingers—Will the Real Employer Please Stand Up! When is an Entity
an Employer in a Sexual Harassment Claim?, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 501
(2003). The district court did not rely on common law horizontal veil piercing to
bring in Harborage I and exonerate FPM.
116. Johns II, 645 N.W.2d 761, 762-63 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
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117

its assets had been liquidated.
Despite the best efforts of Ms.
Johns, her attorneys, and the district court, Ms. Johns was still left
without a viable defendant to satisfy her judgment.
Ms. Johns moved to add Jillian’s as a defendant to her
118
complaint on the theory of successor liability.
The district court
granted Ms. Johns’s motion and ultimately found Jillian’s
119
responsible.
A. Analysis of the Entity Piercing Determination
Before Ms. Johns could successfully get to Jillian’s assets,
however, she somehow had to connect Jillian’s to Harborage, Inc.
or Harborage I, the entities determined to be Ms. Johns’s joint or
integrated “employer.” That is, she had two separate hurdles to
cross to get a remedy against Jillian’s. First, Ms. Johns had to
convince the courts to create a link among all of the original Gators
entities, including FPM. Second, Ms. Johns needed the courts to
find that Jillian’s was the successor of that redefined amalgam.
The problem for Ms. Johns and the courts was that Jillian’s
connection with the original employer, Harborage, Inc., was nonexistent. Jillian’s connection with Harborage I was by way of the
TSA, whereby Harborage I simply agreed to provide administrative
and labor services to Gators until certain employees could be
120
transferred to Jillian’s payroll.
Jillian’s connection with FPM was
by way of the asset purchase agreement. Figure 5 illustrates the
separate relationships of Jillian’s with Harborage I and with FPM,
the remaining solvent entities that had been the original Gators
operation.

117. Johns III, 664 N.W.2d at 293.
118. Johns II, 645 N.W.2d at 763. Harborage I did not oppose the motion to
amend the complaint to include Jillian’s as a defendant. Id.
119. Johns III, 664 N.W.2d at 294; Johns v. Harborage, Inc., No. 95-17129, at 3-4
(Minn. Dist. Ct. Sept. 30, 2000) (district court memorandum). The district court
added Jillian’s as a defendant on the grounds that: (1) Jillian’s knew well its
potential liability, (2) the effect, if not the intent, of the APA was to block
collection of a valid judgment, (3) Jillian’s was aware of the vital role Harborage I
played in the operation of Gators, (4) Harborage I had other ties to the Sellers,
and (5) Harborage I’s principals (Greener and McReynolds) benefited
substantially from the sale while avoiding valid judgment debt. Johns v.
Harborage, Inc., No. 9517129, at 6 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Sept. 30, 2000) (district court
memorandum).
120. Johns II, 645 N.W.2d at 763.
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Figure 5: Jillian’s Actual Relationship with Gators Entities

JILLIAN’S

HARBORAGE I
(TSA)

FPM, Ltd.
(APA)

Under traditional successor liability principles, the asset
purchase agreement between Jillian’s and FPM provided the most
substantial basis for some connection between Jillian’s and the
three entities originally involved in the Gators operation. That is,
common law courts had sometimes found successor liability in the
asset transfer context despite an attempt by the parties to limit the
121
transferee’s liability.
The problem in Johns was that FPM
previously had been absolved from liability, at least to the extent of
not being considered to be Ms. Johns’s “employer” under the Title
VII joint or integrated employer doctrine. The courts needed
some way to combine the operations of Harborage I and FPM.
Despite the finding by the district court that FPM was not Ms.
Johns’s employer for Title VII purposes, the supreme court did find
a basis for tying Harborage I and FPM together as one entity. The
theory applied was the common law enterprise entity theory of
horizontal piercing in the entity-based limited liability context.
The supreme court refused to view Harborage I and FPM as
122
separate entities.
According to the supreme court, they were
functionally both pieces of the same business operation, that is,
123
Gators Bar and Grill. That is, no matter who the employer was, the
business as a on-going concern necessitated inclusion of all the
pieces, including FPM. “Although Greene [sic] and McReynolds
were free to unbundle the business into as many legal entities as
they choose, the policies that underlie Title VII cannot be avoided
by attempting to confine the ‘employer’ function to a limited entity
that has no purpose independent of the business as a whole. Greene [sic]
and McReynolds were only able to operate Gators by joining the
124
efforts of all of the related entities.”
121.
122.
123.
124.

See supra text accompanying notes 38-43.
Johns III, 664 N.W.2d at 299.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss2/3

28

Matheson: The Limits of Business Limited Liability: Entity Veil Piercing an
MATHESON (CB & CKI)-REFORMATTED

2004]

11/14/2004 5:28:26 PM

LIMITS OF BUSINESS LIMITED LIABILITY

439

According to the supreme court, Harborage, Inc., Harborage
I, and FPM while ostensibly separate legal entities, were
125
functionally one business operation. The legal framework had to
be reconstructed to fit the practical and operational reality. The
language from Adolph Berle’s famous 1947 article on horizontal
piercing fits precisely:
Another illustration of judicial erection of a new entity
occurs in situations where the corporate personality (as
embodied in its charter, books and so forth) does not
correspond to the actual enterprise, but merely to a
fragment of it. The result is to construct a new aggregate
of assets and liabilities . . . . The decisions disregard the
paper corporate personalities and base the results on the
126
assets of the enterprise.
Therefore, according to the supreme court, the appropriate
way to view the Gators pre-Jillian’s organizational structure is
illustrated by Figure 6.
Figure 6: The Horizontally Combined Entities Comprising Gators
Restaurant
McReynolds and Greener

Harborage, Inc./

Harborage I, Ltd./

FPM, Ltd.

Just like the historic situations involving taxicab companies, the
separate existences of the three entities that originally comprised
Gators were horizontally pierced to become one legally reformed
business entity.
Justice Gilbert’s dissent took the majority to task on the issue
of horizontally combining the separate entities that comprised
127
Gators. According to Justice Gilbert:
The foundation for the majority opinion made at the
district court is full of fault lines that should not be
125. Id.
126. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 343,
348 (1947).
127. Johns III, 664 N.W.2d at 300-03 (Gilbert, J., dissenting).
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expanded upon by this court.
....
This reasoning is problematic for a number of reasons. It
ignores the separate, valid and legal existence of the
various entities. Moreover, this rationale is used to pierce
the separate independent veil of each entity because “the
principals benefited” from the sale. A new legal theory
has been created in Minnesota, which appears to abolish
the distinction between separate legal entities as long as
the principals of the various entities benefited from the
transaction. Again, the majority fails to cite to authority
128
for this major new proposition.
Justice Gilbert seems to be right in part. Johns III does appear
to be the first time the Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted,
albeit inartfully, the enterprise entity theory of horizontal veil
piercing among business entities. In response, however, the
supreme court majority might have said that this theory is not so
novel, but rather is the well-worn enterprise entity or horizontal
piercing theory of corporate law, and that the authority for this not
so new and not so major proposition comes from Adolph Berle and
the taxicab cases.
In any event, Minnesota now has support for horizontal veil
piercing from its highest court. As Justice Gilbert aptly summarized
the supreme court majority’s enterprise entity horizontal piercing
analysis:
[this] legal theory ignores the fact that these separate
companies were long in existence and were not set up to
defraud the appellant or anyone else. Appellant was only
hired by, worked for, and harmed in the employment
context by Harborage I. Now, long after the appellant has
left the employment and lost in the first go-around in
court against FPM, the district court has successfully
bundled up all of these separate business entities to make
129
each one liable for the debts of the others.
The legal entity had been reformed to reflect the practical
128. Id. at 301.
129. Id. at 301-02. Justice Gilbert knew what this meant for Jillian’s: “By
concluding that Jillian's is liable to the appellant as a successor-employer, the
district court ignored the fact that FPM was only the seller of these assets and had
been previously absolved of any responsibility by this same district court and now 3
years after the initial decision, attributes liability to ‘the Jillian defendants.’” Id. at
302.
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reality of the business enterprise.
B. State and Federal Successor Liability—One Step Forward and One Step
Back
The next step to ultimately holding Jillian’s liable to Ms. Johns
was to determine if Jillian’s was a successor to the combined Gators
entities, Haborage, Inc., Harborage I, and FPM. The supreme
court’s analysis on this point consists of two parts: first, successor
liability under state law, that is, the MBCA, and second, successor
130
liability under federal Title VII employment discrimination law.
Each of these parts deserves separate consideration.
1.

The Rationalization of Minnesota Successor Liability Law

Maybe the most significant aspect of the Johns III decision in
the supreme court was its clarification and narrowing of successor
131
liability under Minnesota corporate law. As discussed above, the
presumption is that, in a transfer of business assets context, the
transferee is not liable for the transferor’s obligations except to the
extent explicitly assumed. Historically, the courts had created four
common law exceptions to this presumption, such as where there
was an implied assumption of debts, a de facto merger, a mere
continuation of the transferring enterprise, or the transaction was
132
entered into fraudulently.
In 1981, when the then-new MBCA was adopted, the
legislature tried to significantly restrict the application of common
law successor liability under Minnesota law. Minnesota Statutes
section 302A.661, subdivision 4, provides simply that “[t]he
transferee is liable for the debts, obligations, and liabilities of the
transferor only to the extent provided in the contract or agreement between
the transferee and the transferor or to the extent provided by this chapter or
133
other statutes of this state.”
Therefore, the intent was to
presumptively limit transferee liability to those liabilities voluntarily
assumed in the asset transfer contract itself. The only stated
exception was for statutory law, that is, “to the extent provided by this
134
chapter or other statutes of this state.”
No room was left for
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 298.
See supra text accompanying notes 35-43.
See supra text accompanying note 42.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.661, subd. 4 (West 2003) (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
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application of the four common law (as opposed to statutory)
135
exceptions that had previously been applied by the courts.
This intent to effectively limit transferee liabilities to those
explicitly assumed and those legislatively mandated, thereby
eliminating the common law jurisprudence in this area (and the
four common law exceptions), is echoed in several places. The
report to the Minnesota legislature prepared by the Advisory Task
Force, the drafting body for the MBCA, states that section 302A.661
“reflects current law with respect to sales of assets except that
subdivisions 3 and 4 are new. They permit . . . the restriction of
successor liability to liabilities imposed by the agreement of transfer
136
[and] by other statutes, such as Article 6 of the U.C.C.” Similarly,
the Reporter’s Notes to section 302A.661, included at the time of
the adoption of the MBCA, provide that “[s]ubdivision 4 of this
section is aimed at limiting civil liabilities of transferors assumed by
transferees to those agreed to between the parties or imposed by law, even if
the transferee is operating the corporation in exactly the same manner as it
137
was operated by the transferor.” Nevertheless, despite this apparently
clear legislative intent to restrict state successor liability, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals and the Minnesota federal courts
continued to apply the four common law exceptions to transferee
138
non-liability even after adoption of the MBCA.
135. J.F. Anderson Lumber Co. v. Myers, 296 Minn. 33, 37-38, 206 N.W.2d 365,
368-69 (1973) (citing 15 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7122 (perm. ed. 1992 & Supp. 2004)). The J.F.
Anderson court stated that the judicially imposed exception for a “continuation of
the selling corporation” did not apply solely because a purchaser carries on the
same business of the seller but instead applies primarily to reorganizations of a
corporation under federal or state statutes. Id.
136. REPORT TO THE SENATE BY THE ADVISORY TASK FORCE ON CORPORATION LAW,
2003-04 Special Pamphlet, at 64 (2004), reported in WEST’S MINNESOTA
CORPORATION, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, AND PARTNERSHIP LAWS (2004-2005).
137. REPORTER’S NOTES—1981 TO SECTION 302A.661 OF THE MBCA, 2003-04
Special Pamphlet, at 297-98 (emphasis added), reported in WEST’S MINNESOTA
CORPORATION, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, AND PARTNERSHIP LAWS (2004-2005).
138. See, e.g., Keller v. Clark Equip. Co., 715 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1044 (1984) (applying de facto merger exception); Gamradt v.
Fed. Labs., Inc., No. 02-CV-816, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16187, ¶ 16,741 (D.
Minn. Sept. 2, 2003) (stating that four common law exceptions continued despite
Minnesota Statutes section 302A.661, subd. 4); Huray v. Fournier NC
Programming, Inc., 2003 Minn. App. LEXIS 620 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (applying
mere continuation exception); Modern Fence & Mfg., Inc. v. Action Enters., Inc.,
1994 Minn. App. LEXIS 60 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (applying fraud exception); see
also N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Landmark Dev. Corp., Nos. C1-92-2006, C7-92-2298, C492-2534, 1993 WL 152157 (Minn. Ct. App. May 11, 1993) (regarding questions of
fact that caused court to reverse lower court’s grant of summary judgment to
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Johns afforded the Minnesota Supreme Court an opportunity
to address the question of the continued vitality of the four
139
common law exceptions to non-liability of transferees directly.
Remember, as visualized by the supreme court, the relationship
between Jillian’s and the horizontally combined Gators entities
looked like Figure 7.
Figure 7: Jillian’s Relationship with the Combined (Solvent) Gators
Entities

JILLIAN’S

HARBORAGE I/
(TSA +

FPM, Ltd.
APA)

The issue of successor liability law, what the majority of the
140
Minnesota Supreme Court called the “heart of the case,” was
whether Jillian’s would be liable as a transferee of these combined
entities under successor liability law. As a matter of Minnesota
successor liability law, both the majority and dissent agreed in their
restrictive interpretation of Minnesota law and the rejection of the
four common law exceptions to transferee non-liability. The
majority held:
Minnesota successor-corporation law, as codified by
plaintiff on issue of whether transfer of assets constituted a de facto merger
resulting in liability of transferee as a de facto successor corporation). No other
recent case has been found in which a Minnesota court suggested that an assets
sale that would not otherwise result in transferee liability might be classified as a
de facto merger creating such liability under the facts presented in the case. In
New York Life, substantially all of the transferor’s assets were transferred to its sister
corporation, and the transferor then liquidated its remaining assets and ceased
doing business. Id. The court determined that section 302A.661, subdivision 4,
was inapplicable because the provision was enacted after the transfer of assets
occurred. Id.
139. In Niccum v. Hydra Tool Corp., 438 N.W.2d 96, 99, 101 (Minn. 1989), the
Minnesota Supreme Court, while citing J.F. Anderson, affirmed summary judgment
in favor of a transferee corporation, noting that Minnesota Statutes section
302A.661, subdivision 4, indicates the Minnesota legislature’s intent to limit any
extension of successor liability.
140. Johns III, 664 N.W.2d 291, 296 (Minn. 2003).
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statute, provides that “The transferee is liable for the
debts, obligations and liabilities of the transferor only to
the extent provided in the contract . . . .” Minn. Stat. §
302A.661, subd. 4 (2002); see also J.F. Anderson Lumber Co.
v. Myers, 296 Minn. 33, 40-41, 206 N.W.2d 365, 370 (1973)
(holding that when one corporation transfers its assets to
another, the receiving corporation is not responsible for
debts of transferor unless it agrees to assume these debts).
Jillian’s did not have successor-corporation liability under
Minnesota’s corporate law because Jillian’s carefully
defined the liabilities it would assume, and debts such as
141
Johns’ judgments were not among them.
There are several monumental aspects of this short section of
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Johns III. Note
first that the majority stated the rule of Minnesota successor liability
just as it had been intended by the legislature when it adopted
section 302A.661 of the MBCA in 1981; that is, that the transferee’s
liabilities are defined by the contract between the transferor and
142
The court did not even qualify its statement by
the transferee.
quoting the explicit exception in section 302A.661 for state statutory
law, although clearly that exception could have applicability in the
right situation. Second, when the court made reference to its pre143
MBCA decision in J.F. Anderson Lumber Co. v. Myers, which had
stated not only the general rule on non-liability for transferees, but
also the four common law exceptions, the supreme court majority
144
in Johns III clarified the holding of that case.
The Minnesota
Supreme Court majority in Johns III cites J.F. Anderson for the
“holding that when one corporation transfers its assets to another,
the receiving corporation is not responsible for debts of transferor
145
Period. No mention of
unless it agrees to assume these debts.”
any common law exceptions to that rule of non-liability is made,
even though the “mere continuation” exception arguably could
146
have been applied on the Johns facts.
Third, when summarizing
its holding as to Jillian’s non-liability under Minnesota successor
liability law, the supreme court majority focused solely on the
141. Id. at 297.
142. Id.
143. 296 Minn. 33, 40-41, 206 N.W.2d 365, 370 (1973).
144. Johns III, 664 N.W.2d at 297.
145. Id.
146. This is clear because the Court found that “substantial continuity”
between Jillian’s and its predecessors was demonstrated for purposes of Title VII
federal successor liability. Id. at 299.
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parties’ agreement, stating that “Jillian’s did not have successorcorporation liability under Minnesota’s corporate law because
Jillian’s carefully defined the liabilities it would assume, and debts
147
such as Johns’ judgments were not among them.”
On this fundamental point of Minnesota corporate law, the
supreme court majority and the dissent found agreement. As the
dissent summarizes: “The majority correctly points out that Jillian’s
did not have successor corporate liability under Minnesota
corporate law. All of the companies here were properly registered
to do business and they carefully defined the liabilities and debts
they wanted to assume and appellant’s debts were not among
148
those.”
It therefore is fair to conclude that a unanimous Minnesota
Supreme Court has conclusively determined that the concept of
successor liability under Minnesota law is fundamentally a function
of the agreement between the parties. Parties to an asset transfer
transaction can define their own allocation of liabilities, which will
not only bind those parties, but also third parties, such as Ms.
Johns, as well as the Minnesota courts. Moreover, absent a finding
of state or federal statutory law imposing greater obligations, a
review of the agreement between the parties is determinative of this
allocation.
These conclusions are a tremendous benefit for parties
negotiating asset transfer transactions involving Minnesota
businesses. The parties can negotiate their asset transfer contracts
confident that their contractual liability allocations are
determinative absent statutory law, such as federal environmental
law or, as in the Johns matter, federal Title VII law, to the contrary.
More important, parties to asset transfer transactions should be
able to avoid costly and substantial litigation with third parties
about the potential applicability of the four common law
exceptions to transferee non-liability that pre-dated adoption of the
MBCA. On the basis of both the majority and the dissent in Johns,
trial courts should summarily dispose of claims to apply these
common law exceptions.
2.

Federal Successor Liability Law under Title VII

The issue of Jillian’s potential successor liability under federal
147.
148.

Id. at 297.
Id. at 300.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004

35

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 3
MATHESON (CB & CKI)-REFORMATTED

446

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

11/14/2004 5:28:26 PM

[Vol. 31:2

Title VII law remained. As the majority of the supreme court
analyzed the issue, its finding of no liability under Minnesota law
and its clarification of successor liability in Minnesota was
important but not dispositive.
“In addition to successorcorporation liability under Minnesota corporate law, a separate and
broader concept of successor-employer liability has been
recognized in federal decisions under Title VII. Because Title VII
provides an alternate basis for the judgments in this case, the
federal doctrine of successor-employer liability must be
149
considered.”
The U.S. Supreme Court first established successor employer
150
liability in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston.
In that case, the
issue was what effect a merger of two companies had on a union
151
The successor employer refused to
bargaining agreement.
bargain with or recognize the union, and it refused to honor the
bargaining agreement the union held with the predecessor
152
employer.
The Court stated that in cases involving federal labor
153
policy, federal law controls.
National labor policy requires
certain protections for workers and those protections may limit the
154
National labor
owner’s freedom to sell his or her company.
155
policy requires a balancing of employer and employee interests.
Considering that the Court ruled that the successor was required to
156
The
arbitrate with the union under the bargaining agreement.
successor was not required to renew the agreement, but it did need
to arbitrate with the union so that a settlement could be reached
for all of the back pay and benefits that the successor had denied

149. Johns III, 664 N.W.2d at 297. This conclusion is also consistent with the
MBCA itself. As the Reporter’s Notes to Section 302A.661 provide, “[o]f course,
federal statutes may preempt this statute in certain areas of liability.” REPORTER’S
NOTES—1981 TO SECTION 302A.661 OF THE MBCA, at 298, 2003-04 Special
Pamphlet, 298 (2003), reported in WEST’S MINNESOTA CORPORATION, LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANY, AND PARTNERSHIP LAWS (2004-05).
150. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
151. Id. at 545.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 548. The Court stated that state law may be used to aid in the
development of appropriate principles or their application to the particular facts
of a case, but ultimately, the law is federal and it supersedes any state laws. Id.
154. Id. at 549.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 548. While ordinary contract law would not hold a successor liable
for something that it had not bargained for, collective bargaining agreements are
not normal contracts. See id. at 549.
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157

the union members since the merger.
In its analysis of the case, the Court set out a two part test for
determining whether a successor has a duty to arbitrate with the
158
union. First, there must be a substantial continuity of identity
between the business before and after the merger or change in
159
ownership.
Second, the successor must have notice of the
employees’ claims so that the successor might consider them when
160
bargaining with the predecessor.
161
Later cases affirmed the holding in John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
The federal circuits expanded the test in John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
162
The landmark case
beyond NLRA cases into Title VII actions.
applying successor employer liability to Title VII cases was EEOC v.
163
MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc.
In that case, the court found
that the similarities between the NLRA and Title VII warranted
applying the same successor employer liability rule to both types of
164
cases.
Examining the breadth of successor liability in the labor
context, the court set out nine factors to consider in a Title VII
165
successor case.
Since MacMillan, other federal courts have
157. Id.
158. Id. at 551.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F.2d 1086, 1089 (6th
Cir. 1974); Johns III, 664 N.W.2d 291, 297 (Minn. 2003); see also Marc A.
Tenenbaum, Fall River: The NLRB’s Expansive Successorship Doctrine, 50 OHIO ST. L.J.
181, 182-85 (1989) (discussing the history of federal successor doctrine).
162. See MacMillan, 503 F.2d at 1094. Later cases followed the precedent set in
MacMillan. See Kevin W. Brown, Annotation, Liability under Title VII of Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e et seq.) of Employer, As Successor Employer, For
Discriminatory Employment Practices of Predecessor, 67 A.L.R. FED. 806 (1984).
163. 503 F.2d 1086 (1974).
164. Id. at 1090 (stating “[w]e are of the view that the considerations set forth
by the Supreme Court in these three cases as justifying a successor doctrine to
remedy unfair labor practices are applicable equally to remedy unfair employment
practices in violation of Title VII”).
165. Id. at 1094. The nine factors set out by the court were:
1) whether the successor company had notice of the charge, 2) the ability
of the predecessor to provide relief, 3) whether there has been a
substantial continuity of business operations, 4) whether the new
employer uses the same plant, 5) whether he uses the same or
substantially the same work force, 6) whether he uses the same or
substantially the same supervisory personnel, 7) whether the same jobs
exist under substantially the same working conditions, 8) whether he uses
the same machinery, equipment and methods of production and 9)
whether he produces the same product.
Id. (citing Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., Hotel & Rest.
Employees & Bartenders Int’l Union, 417 U.S. 249, 256-58 (1974); Golden State
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interpreted the MacMillan test so that the last seven factors actually
form the first part of the two part test: substantial continuity of
166
business operations.
The second part of the test is notice of the
167
claim.
The Minnesota Supreme Court analyzed the particular facts of
168
Johns III under this two pronged test.
For the majority of the
supreme court, much of the groundwork for a finding of successor
Title VII liability in Johns III had been accomplished by its
horizontal piercing and combination of the three entities that
169
comprised Gators before Jillian’s entered the picture.
In
examining the continuity of business operations, the Minnesota
Supreme Court considered the entire Gators restaurant as the
business. The court argued that even though the owners of Gators
were free to “unbundle the business into as many legal entities as
they choose, the policies that underlie Title VII cannot be avoided
by attempting to confine the ‘employer’ function to a limited entity

Bottling Co., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 414 U.S. 168, 170-71, 184 (1973); N.L.R.B. v. Burns
Int’l Sec. Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 274, 280-81 (1972); John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 376
U.S. at 551; N.L.R.B v. Interstate 65 Corp., 453 F.2d 269, 272-74 (6th Cir. 1971);
N.L.R.B. v. Zayre Corp., 424 F.2d 1159, 1162 (5th Cir. 1970); Overnite Transp. v.
N.L.R.B., 372 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1967)).
166. See Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 750 (5th Cir. 1996);
Musikiwamba v. ESSI, 760 F.2d 740, 751 (7th Cir. 1985); Bates v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n,
744 F.2d 705, 710 (9th Cir. 1984); Howard v. Penn Cent. Transp., 87 F.R.D. 342,
347 n.6 (N.D. Ohio 1980); EEOC v. Stephen T. Cox, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
25674, at *17 (M.D. Tenn. 2001); Brown, supra note 161, § 2.
167. Under Title VII, the notice factor requires that the injured employee have
filed a claim with the EEOC prior to the transfer of company assets. See Rabidue v.
Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 616 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing Wiggins v. Spector
Freight Sys., Inc., 583 F.2d 882, 886 (6th Cir. 1978) (holding that the successor
employer could not be held liable because the plaintiff had not filed a claim with
the EEOC prior to the company acquisition). So, the Title VII notice requirement
has two components for the employee to show successor employer liability: actual
notice to the successor of the claim, and the filing of an EEOC claim prior to the
transfer.
168. Johns III, 664 N.W.2d 291, 299-300 (Minn. 2003).
169. Id. at 299. It is also important to note that under federal successor
liability, the method of transfer is not determinative of whether a successor has
liability. Golden State Bottling Co., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 414 U.S. 168, 182 n.5 (1973).
The Supreme Court reasoned that the policies underlying the labor law doctrine
of successorship allowed for a broader application of liability. Id. So while some
states may limit successor liability based on the type of transfer conducted, federal
doctrine does not distinguish between mergers, consolidations, and purchases of
assets as long as the three pronged test for successor liability is satisfied. Id.; Chi.
Truck Drivers, Helpers, and Warehouse Workers Union (Indep.) Pension Fund v.
Tasemkin, Inc., 59 F.3d 48, 49 (7th Cir. 1995).
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that has no purpose independent of the business as a whole.”
Noting that the employees, managers, location, name of the
restaurant, and menu all remained the same, the court ruled that
as a matter of law, a substantial continuity of business operations
171
was shown.
As to the notice requirement, Jillian’s did not contend that it
172
lacked notice of the judgment against Harborage I. Jillian’s hired
the employees who were involved in the litigation with Johns,
173
including Harborage I’s human resources director.
The court
concluded that Jillian’s was aware of the judgment for Ms. Johns
and had the opportunity to take that judgment into account when
174
bargaining for Gators.
The court ruled that Jillian’s had the
175
proper notice required for successor liability to attach.
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s finding of federal successor
liability under Title VII piggy-backed on its finding of horizontal
piercing among the three original Gators entities. Once combined,
Jillian’s was involved in an asset transfer with them and the fact that
FPM had been initially found not to be an “employer” did not
prevent its being found to be a part of the enterprise entity that
constituted Gators and to which Jillian’s succeeded.
As the supreme court viewed the transactions between Jillian’s
and the combined entity, “[b]y the combination of the APA and
176
TSA, Jillian’s acquired control of all of the related entities.” As to
Jillian’s claim that it should only be tied to FPM through the APA,
the supreme court responded that “[a]lthough we do not fully
understand the district court’s decision not to enter judgment
against FPM, we do not regard this as fatal to successor-employer
liability because . . . the judgment against Harborage I implicates the
177
entire business of Gators, to which Jillian’s succeeded.”

170. Johns III, 664 N.W.2d at 299.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 300.
174. Id.
175. Id. Because a judgment had already been entered in the case, the
requirement for filing an EEOC claim was clearly met. Johns had to file the EEOC
claim before she could bring a suit against Harborage I.
176. Id. at 299.
177. Id. (emphasis added).
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V. CONCLUSION
Johns v. Harborage I, Ltd. is a complex amalgam of facts and
legal issues. It provided the Minnesota Supreme Court with the
opportunity to address several significant legal issues. The result of
that analysis provides some guidance for entrepreneurs and their
counsel with respect to the limits of limited liability in the entity
and transactional settings. First, as to entity based limited liability,
the court accepted the concept of horizontal veil piercing in order
to legally reform a series of related entities to reflect their
operational business enterprise reality. Second, as to transactional
based limited liability, the Minnesota Supreme Court clarified
Minnesota successor liability law by limiting successor liability to
only those obligations explicitly assumed by the parties and those
imposed by state or federal statutory law. As a matter of state
successor liability law, application of the previously employed four
common law exceptions is gone. This is consistent with the
Minnesota legislature’s intent in adopting the MBCA. Finally, in its
least remarkable action, the Minnesota Supreme Court applied
federal Title VII successor liability law in a manner consistent with
its application by the federal courts in other employment
discrimination cases.
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